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Abstract 
This study presents an attempt to investigate the impact of exchange rate misalignment on capital inflows in Malaysia. 
Specifically, a precise threshold value is estimated to examine when exchange rate misalignment suppresses capital 
inflows. To pursue these objectives, this study relies on the endogenous threshold analysis as of Hansen (1996, 2000). 
Results suggest that misalignment in terms of currency overvaluation, has a negative and significant effect when 
overvaluation is more than 15 percent. This estimate is consistent and robust despite the changes in the choice of 
explanatory variables.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has served as an important engine of growth via skills and 
technology transfer, creation of employment opportunities and expanding the capital stock in 
Malaysia.  There was a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) into Malaysia in the late 
1980s and this trend continues until the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Another 
acute slump in the influx of FDI occurs in 2001 when the economy was in a slight recession 
but picks up again in 2002 thereafter.  With the recent burgeoning world recession following 
the American sub-mortgage crisis, it is expected that FDI will contract again (IMF, 2009). 
 
Since  early  1980s,  real  exchange  rate  misalignment  has  become  a  standard  concept  in 
international macroeconomic theory and policy (Razin & Collins, 1997).  Hence, this study 
focuses on exchange rate misalignment as an indicator of capital inflow competitiveness in 
the case of Malaysia.    Malaysia provides  an interesting case as it is  one of the largest 
recipients of FDI amongst its ASEAN counterparts.  Another advantage of undertaking a 
single country study is the ability to delineate the assumption that countries are similar in 
terms of social, cultural, economic and politically (Sun et al., 2002).  Therefore, only relevant 
economic determinants will be accounted for.   
 
The objective of this paper is to present an empirical content of the relationship between 
capital inflows and exchange rate misalignment.  Whilst existing literature focuses on the role 
of exchange rate, this study takes a step further to examine the impact of exchange rate 
misalignment  on  capital  inflows.    Specifically,  we  estimate  a  threshold  value  at  which 
misalignment begins to significantly affect capital inflows.  To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to estimate a threshold value for misalignment, hence, constituting the 
novelty  of  the  study.    Based  on  the  endogenous  autoregressive  threshold  (TAR)  model 
developed  by  Hansen  (2000),  Results  suggest  that  exchange  rate  misalignment  due  to 
overvaluation is detrimental to the influx of capital inflows.  Unlike previous study which 
utilizes  UNCTAD’s  data  and  definition  of  FDI,  this  study  employs  the  data  from  Bank 
Negara Malaysia. Foreign capital inflows or investment inflows comprises three items: (i) 
equity investment, (ii) loans and (iii) real estate. 
The next section provides a brief explication of the theoretical model and review of 
literature.    The  third  section  spells  out  the  method  pertaining  to  the  objective.    The 
penultimate section provides results and discussion and the final section concludes. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON 
DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL INFLOWS 
 
This  study  adopts  the  Markowitz-Tobin  model  of  portfolio  selection  to  identify  the 
determinants of capital flows into Malaysia.  This portfolio balance approach models the 
allocation of wealth between domestic and foreign assets.  Branson (1968) postulates that the 
proportion of foreign assets (K
f) in a given stock of wealth is a function of the domestic and 
foreign interest rates (I and I*), the measure of exchange rate expectation or risk (E) and the 
stock of wealth (W) expressed as: 
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Darby  et  al.  (1999),  augment  this  concept  of  exchange  rate  risk  (E)  into  exchange  rate 
misalignment (M).   In a compact form, equation (1) is expressed as follows: 
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We also include other potential variables that could explain the behaviour of capital inflows 
in Malaysia, Z,  
 
             Z W M I I K
f
4 3 2 1 0 *) (                        (3) 
 
The enigmatic relationship between FDI and exchange rate nexus has been widely examined 
and most of the discussions root back to the work of Kohlhagen (1977), Cushman (1985), 
Froot and Stein (1991), Goldberg (1993) and Darby et al. (1999).   The mechanisms that 
exchange rate affects capital inflows can also be viewed via the wealth effect channel and the 
relative production cost channel (Xing, 2006).  A devaluation of the currency of the host 
country makes local cost of production lower in terms of foreign currency hence leading to 
higher returns from export-oriented industries.  As for the wealth effect, a devaluation makes 
local  asset  cheaper  which  motivates  investors  to  acquire  more.    Kohlhagen  (1977)  static 
model  postulates  that  following  depreciation  in  host  countries,  MNEs  will  increase  their 
production capacity.  In a two period dynamic model, Cushman (1985) suggests that adjusted 
expected real depreciation lowers production costs and as a result, leads to increase in FDI 
flows.  Similarly, Goldberg (1993) illustrates how sectoral profitability, location effects, and 
portfolio and wealth effects are important factors that determine investment and their links 
with exchange rates.  In her theoretical model, the direction of investment effects triggered by 
exchange rate movements is ambiguous, therefore, warrants empirical research.  Ray (1989) 
shows  that  relatively  cheap  US  dollar  serves  as  a  significant  stimulus  for  foreign  direct 
investment in the United States. On contrary, in an imperfect information framework, Froot 
and  Stein  (1991)  show  that  appreciation  induces  wealth  effect  of  foreign  investors,  thus, 
promotes  foreign  investors  to  acquire  more  local  assets.    Empirically,  there  is  quite  a 
consensus that a depreciation of the exchange rate in the host country leads to a reduction of 
the FDI (Dewenter, 1995).   
 
There is however, a dearth of literature of studies that empirically examined the relationship 
between FDI and exchange rate misalignment.  Empirical attempts include Benassy-Quere et 
al. (2001) who advocate the benefits of depreciation may be offset by excessive volatility of 
the exchange rate. Blonigen (1997) illustrates how currency depreciation induces foreign firm 
to acquire firm-specific assets when markets are segmented.  Hasnat (1999) study the impact 
of misalignment on FDI for five developed nations on annual data ranging from 1976-1995.  
All of these studies use misalignment as a control variable or a counterpart for exchange rate 
variability and is measured as a deviation from the PPP values.  Furthermore, most of these 
studies are based on the experiences of industrialized economies using panel data analysis 
framework.  In short, a prolonged misalignment may affect long term business decisions with 
regard to costs.  If the exchange rate is overvalued relative to the estimated equilibrium level, 
then investors may perceived that acquire more domestic assets for future capital gains in 
home currency terms (Barrell and Pain, 1996).  On the other hand, persistent overvaluation 
may  reduce  cost  competitiveness  of  production  in  the  host  country  especially  for  export 
oriented products. 
 
Focusing on Z variable, the literature suggests a number of variables that determines capital 
flows.  The determinants of FDI can be demarcated into at least two categories – micro and 
macro determinants.  The list of micro-determinants spans from market size, growth, labour 
costs, host government policies, tariffs to trade barriers.  The macro-determinants include 
market size (Chakrabarti, 2001), openness (Edwards, 1990; Aseidu, 2002), rate of inflation 
(Bajo-Rubia and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994; Urata and Kawai, 2000), government budget, taxes 
(Gastanaga et al., 1998; Wei, 2000) and infrastructure (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Urata and 
Kawai, 2000).  Financial deepening is also another catalyst for FDI (Borensztein et al., 1998).    3 
Liquid liability, private credit and M3 serve as proxies.  Increase in money supply fuels 
inflation which increases the cost of production in the host country rendering a negative 
relationship. Table 1 provides the data used in this study.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3. EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE AND MISALIGNMENT 
 
Exchange rate misalignment is defined as the deviation of the real effective exchange rate 
from  the  equilibrium  (hypothetical)  exchange  rate.    The  equilibrium  exchange  rate  is  a 
function of a set of macroeconomic fundamental variables namely productivity, openness, 
government spending and net foreign assets (see for example Sekkat and Varaodakis, 2000).  
Misalignment  in  this  paper  follows  the  estimation  in  Sidek  and  Yusoff  (2009).    The 
equilibrium real exchange rate derived via vector error correction technique (VECM) is: 
 
  REER = 2.3113PRODUCTIVITY + 0.801 OPENESS - 3.1996GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
                 – 0.3365NET FOREIGN ASSETS – 0.3610 
 
To derive misalignment, we subtract the actual REER from the equilibrium real exchange rate 
calculated from the above equation.  Figure 1 shows the actual and the equilibrium exchange 
rates.    When  the  actual  REER  is  above  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate,  the  currency  is 
overvalued and vice versa. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
4.   METHODOLOGY 
 
The  question  of  when  does  misalignment  begin  to  significantly  affect  capital  inflows 
necessitate the existence of a non-linear relationship between these two variables.  Thus, if 
such non-linear relationship  exist, then it is  possible to  estimate an inflexion  point, or a 
threshold value, at which the sign of misalignment may change or become significant.  In the 
non-linear time series modelling, the threshold autoregressive model (TAR) is more popular 
since it offers a relatively simple specification, estimation and interpretation compared to 
other non-linear models.  Hansen (1996, 2000) derives the asymptotic distribution of the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the endogeneous threshold parameters which will 
be  utilize  in  this  study.  According  to  Hansen  (2000),  threshold  estimation  is  the  act  of 
splitting the sample into two regimes when the threshold value is unknown.  In this study, the 
threshold  estimation  will  split  the  sample  into  high  misalignment  and  low  misalignment 
regime.  Since misalignment is a continuous variable, TAR model would be appropriate to 
engender the threshold value.  Formally, the two-regime threshold regression model takes the 
form: 
t t t e x y  
'
1  ,     t q ,                                     (5) 
t t t e x y  
'
2  ,     t q ,                                     (6) 
 
where  t q  is the threshold variable and is used to split the sample into two regimes,   is the 
threshold value which is unknown and must be estimated,  t y  denotes the dependent variable, 
capital inflow,  t x  represents a vector of explanatory variables (m-vector) and  t e  is the error 
term assumed to be white noise and i.i.d.  Rewriting equation (5) and (6) in a single equation, 
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'                                           (7)   4 
where  2     and  2 1      .  Equation (7) allows all the regression parameters  ,  n   and 
  to be estimated and switch between the two regimes.  The least square (LS) technique is 
used to estimate   through minimization of the sum of squared errors function.   
 
The second step is to examine whether the derived threshold value  ) ( is statistically 
significant.  The confidence interval region is based on the likelihood ratio statistic  ) ( n LR .  
Based on Hansen (2000), let C represent the desired asymptotic confidence interval (in this 
study  at  95%)  and  ) (C c c     be  the  C-level  critical  value  and  set    c LRn    ) ( : ˆ   .  
Assuming homoscedasticity,  C P    ) ˆ ( 0   as    n , therefore,   ˆ  is the asymptotic C-
level confidence region for  .  If the homoscedasticity condition is not fulfilled, then a scale 
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and the adjusted confidence region becomes  } ) ( : { ˆ * * c LRn       such that is robust 
* ˆ   is 
robust  whether  or  not  the  heteroscedasticity  condition  hold.    Simulation  is  set  at  1000 
replication as suggested by Hansen (2000).  Also,  ) (
*  n LR  is not normally distributed hence, 
the  valid    asymptotic  confidence  intervals  of  the  estimated  threshold  values  in  the  no-
rejection areas defined as        1 1 ln( 2 ) ( c , where  is a given asymptotic level; and 
the no- rejection region of the confidence interval is    1 .  If  ) ( ) ( 0 1   c LR  , than the null 
hypothesis of  0 0 :    H cannot be rejected.  In addition, to examine the possibility of a 
second threshold value, the same exercise is repeated. 
 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The baseline regression constitutes the exchange rate misalignment, interest differential and a 
measure of financial development, M3.  We present three additional models with different 
variables added to the baseline regression namely liquid liability, government budget deficit 
and infrastructure for sensitivity analysis.  Hansen (2000) theoretical construct allows for two 
threshold effects, hence, the first step is to investigate the possible existence of such an effect.  
Prior to that, a threshold variable needs to be selected.  Since the aim of this section is to 
examine at what percentage exchange rate misalignment actually hurt capital inflows, the 
appropriate  threshold  variable  is  the  exchange  rate  misalignment.    Upon  choosing  the 
appropriate threshold variable, the next step is to observe any evidence of a threshold effect 
and whether there exist one or more threshold by employing the heteroscedasticity-consistent 
Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for a threshold based on Hansen (1996).   To test   under the 
null hypothesis of no threshold effect, p-values are calculated using a bootstrap analog which 
generates  the  dependent  variable  from  the  distribution  ) ˆ , 0 (
2
t e N ,  where  t e ˆ   is  the  OLS 
residuals from the estimated threshold model.  With 1000 bootstrap replications, the p-values 
for the all four threshold model (Table 2) using misalignment strongly suggest the existence 
of threshold effect at 0.000 significant levels.  Subsequently, this suggests that there is a 
sample split based on the effect of exchange rate misalignment.   
 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
   5 
Figure  2,  for  Model  1,  illustrates  the  graph  of  the  normalized  likelihood  ratio  sequence 
) (
*  n LR  as a function of the threshold in exchange rate misalignment.  The estimated   is the 
value which minimizes these graphs which range at ˆ=15.02-15.44%.  The dotted lines on 
the graphs present the 95% critical values.  For example, in model 1, the asymptotic 95% 
confidence interval set  %] 84 . 9 %, 03 . 15 [ ˆ *      where  ) (
*  n LR  crosses the dotted lines.  The 
results suggest that there is ample evidence for a two-regime specification.  Also, it is worth 
noting that 41 of the 71 observations fall into the 95% confidence interval, hence, requires an 
examination of the possible existence of a second sample split.  Results in Table 2, show that 
second sample split renders insignificant bootstrap p-value thus, indicating no further regime 
split. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
Table 3 presents the results for baseline regression.  Basically, the variables confer the correct 
signs in line with the prediction of the theory.  Misalignment has a negative and significant 
effect  on  capital  inflows  in  the  upper  regime.    Interest  differentials  only  affects  capital 
inflows positively in the lower regime but is insignificant in the upper regime.  Similarly, M3 
has significant effect in both regime but is positive in the lower regime but the sign switches 
in the upper regime. 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
To check for the sensitivity of the results, Table 4 represents three other models which use 
different variables in addition to the baseline regression.  For comparison, this study provides 
the  linear  OLS  model  without  the  threshold  effect  and  a  two-regime  model  which 
accommodates the threshold effect.  The results show that below the threshold value of 15%, 
exchange rate misalignment may be negative but are not statistically significant.  However, 
above the 15% threshold level, misalignment exerts both negative and significant impact on 
capital inflows.  A 1% increase in misalignment (overvaluation) suppresses capital inflows by 
1.11% - 1.55%.  The negative effect of exchange rate misalignment on capital inflows is 
consistent with the findings of Hasnat (1999).  Barrel and Pain (1996) argue that an apparent 
currency misalignment persistent over some length of time may affect investment inflows 
decisions.  A reasonable explanation is that the relative production costs may be higher as a 
result of such misalignment.  If the ringgit is thought to be overvalued relative to its estimated 
equilibrium  level,  then foreign  production  may  be  discouraged  by  the  prospect  of  future 
capital loss in home currency terms. 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Another issue which emerges after the 1997 financial crisis is that capital inflows must be 
managed since reversals are likely to cause severe damage to the economy.  Reinhart and 
Reinhart (1998) calls for greater exchange rate flexibility which is meant to introduce two-
way risks, therefore, discouraging speculative capital inflows.  It is, however, only possible in 
the context of de facto peg or a tightly managed float.  Furthermore, the effectiveness of this 
policy  depends  on  how  much  policymakers  are  willing  to  allow  the  exchange  rate  to 
fluctuate.  A large band denotes greater flexibility but risks having large nominal appreciation 
which connotes possible overvaluation of the currency.  The result of this study suggests that 
overvaluation  is  detrimental  to  capital  inflows  if  this  band  exceeds  15%.  Hence, 
policymakers should keep exchange rate fluctuations well below this 15% threshold. 
 
The addition of taxes yields insignificant results without drastically changing the threshold 
value.  Other additional variables such as government budget deficit and liquid liability are   6 
only significant in one of the two regimes
1.  Interest rate differential are consistently positive 
and significant in all specifications and in both regimes in majority of the threshold model.  
This stresses the role of interest rates in attracting capital inflows into Malaysia.  Although 
the impact may be small, it is significant and the  authorities should ensure that interest rates 
are kept at certain levels to maintain competitiveness of Malaysia  as destination for capital 
investment.  In this  paper, the estimated impact of a 1% change in interest differential is 
expected to subdue foreign investment by 0.04%-0.05% in the first regime and 0.02%-0.06% 
in the second regime.  The proxy for financial deepening, M3 is statistically significant in all 
models and in both regimes.  Again, this signifies the importance of financial development in 
attracting capital investment into Malaysia.  Interestingly, M3 is positive during the periods 
of low misalignment regime but becomes negative at higher misalignme nt regime.  During 
low misalignment, a 1% increase in M3 is expected to draw in 0.2% -0.3% more investment 
inflow into Malaysia.  This shows that in the lower regime, financial depth acts as an impetus 
to capital inflows.  However, the situation reverse wit h 0.49%-0.67% lower investment 
inflows is expected with a 1% increase in misalignment in the second threshold regime.  
Montiel (1999) explicitly explains this phenomenon where capital inflows increase reserves 
which then prompt an increase in the monetary  base, M2 and M3.  Such increases fuels 
further increments in domestic demand leading to real appreciation.  Thus, any overvaluation 
of the currency may eventually have negative ramifications on capital inflows. 
 
In view of the results, it seems evident tha t the exchange rate policy has important effect in 
attracting foreign capital inflows into Malaysia.  Specifically, misalignment in terms of 





The objective of this chapter is to examine the impact of exchange rate misalignment on 
capital inflows.  Results provide evidences of the negative impact of misalignment on capital 
inflows.  To reiterate, overvaluation of the ringgit signals that Malaysia is less competitive 
vis-à-vis other countries.  This paper also estimates a threshold value of approximately 15 
percent; that is the degree of overvaluation after which it begins to hurt capital inflows.  By 
employing a recent technique by Hansen (1996, 2000), this study splits the sample into high 
misalignment and low  misalignment regimes.  This  study shows that  misalignments  hurt 
capital inflows in the high misalignment regime or when misalignment is greater than 15 
percent.  This study also confirms the work of Goh (2005) who suggests that the portfolio 
balance model can capture the determinants of capital inflows in Malaysia.  In particular, the 
results  suggest  that  interest  differential  is  an  important  determinant  albeit,  small,  hence, 
policies  should  be  directed  into  maintaining  a  certain  level  of  competitive  interest  rates.  
Furthermore, it is evident that financial deepening plays an important role to attract capital 
inflows.  Finally,  it  is  important  for  the  Malaysian  authorities  continue  to  intervene  the 








                                                 
1 Inclusion of other variables namely openness, real effective exchange rate, bilateral rates between Malaysia 
and US,inflation, volatility, infrastructure and lagged variables of I(1) regressors yield mostly insignificant 
results, hence not are reported.   Results are available upon request.   7 
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Table 1: Possible Determinants of Capital Inflows - Data description and sources (1991Q1-
2008Q3) 
Variable  Description  Measurement  Source 
I  Foreign investment  Total  foreign  investment  inflow  as  a 
percentage of GDP (in logarithms) 
BNM 
M3  Money supply  M3 as a percentage of GDP  IFS 
D  Government deficit  The  difference  between  revenue  and 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
BNM 
R  Interest differential  The  difference  between  Malaysia  and  US  3-
month T-Bill rates 
IFS 
T  Taxation  Government  corporate  tax  revenue  as  a 
percentage of GDP  
BNM 
LL  Liquid Liability  Log International liquidity: banking institution 
liability, line. 7b.d 
IFS 
Notes: IFS: International Financial Statistics, IMF, BNM: Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 







































Table 2: Threshold Effects 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
First Sample Split 
F-Stats  51.4045  71.1442  45.9364  53.3722 
Bootstrap P-Value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 











Second Sample Split 
F-Stats  16.2171  16.4917  19.7585  22.9710 
Bootstrap P-Value  0.2890  0.5310  0.3800  0.2420 
Note: H0: No threshold effect.  The threshold is based on the minimized sum of squared residuals. 
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Linear Model  Threshold Model 
OLS without threshold  Regime 1   15.0259%  Regime 2 > 15.0259% 
Misalignment  -0.4267**  -0.3186  -1.1955** 
(-0.2115)  (-0.2573)  (-0.5712) 
Interest Differential  0.0250***  0.0438*  0.0261 
(-0.0131)  (-0.01533)  (-0.0193) 
M3  0.2964*  0.2644*  -0.5560* 
(-0.0391)  (-0.0516)  (-0.124) 
Constant   3.0468*  2.5394*  6.7313* 
(-0.2779)  (-0.2593)  (-0.6099) 
No. of Observations  71  42  29 
R
2  0.3664  0.6484  0.4218 
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Table 4:  Sensitivity Analysis for threshold estimates 
 
Model 2 
Linear Model  Threshold Model 
OLS without threshold  Regime 1   15.4461%  Regime 2 > 15.4461% 
Misalignment  -0.4278***  -0.3497  -1.5593* 
(-0.2216)  (-0.4143)  (-0.3135) 
Interest Differential  0.0250***  0.0462*  0.0599* 
(-0.0134)  (-0.0153)  (-0.0131) 
M3  0.2966*  0.2732*  -0.5609* 
(-0.0414)  (-0.0488)  (-0.0744) 
Liquid Liability  -0.0029  -0.0634  1.1843* 
(-0.1709)  (-0.1932)  (-0.2615) 
Constant   2.9780*  2.5259*  6.1799* 
(-0.2713)  (-0.2593)  (-0.3135) 
No. of Observations  71  41  30 
R
2  0.3842  0.6503  0.5986 
          
 
Model 3 
Linear Model  Threshold Model 
OLS without threshold  Regime 1   15.0260%  Regime 2 > 15.0260% 
Misalignment  -0.4472**  -0.380  -1.1171*** 
(-0.2038)  (-0.246)  (-0.6229) 
Interest Differential  0.0254*  0.0505*  0.0237 
(-0.0126)  (-0.014)  (-0.0221) 
M3  0.2844*  0.2521*  -0.5391 
(-7.4922)  (-0.0472)  (-0.1477) 
Deficit  -0.7655*  -0.7380*  -0.1841 
(-0.3059)  (-0.3099)  (-0.7174) 
Constant   3.0308*  2.5835*  6.6452* 
(-0.2674)  (-0.2445)  (-0.7337) 
No. of Observations  71  42  29 
R
2  0.4285  0.6829  0.423 
           
 
Model 4 
Linear Model  Threshold Model 
OLS without threshold  Regime 1   15.0260%  Regime 2 > 15.0260% 
Misalignment  -0.2852  -0.2582  1.2490** 
(-0.2181)  (-0.272)  (-0.5612) 
Interest Differential  0.0275**  0.0419*  0.0311 
(-0.0128)  (-0.0165)  (-0.0204) 
M3  0.3208*  0.2796*  -0.5489* 
(-0.0401)  (-0.0583)  (-0.1245) 
Tax  2.1899**  0.1283  0.126 
(-1.0761)  (-0.1457)  (-0.172) 
Constant   3.0274*  2.2463*  6.5027* 
(-0.4383)  (-0.4806)  (-0.7227) 
No. of Observations  71  42  29 
R
2  0.3665  0.6516  0.43 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively. . Standard errors are in parentheses 